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Abstract
We compare theoretical and empirical forecasts computed by rational agents living 
in a model economy to those produced by professional forecasters. We focus on the 
variance of the prediction errors as a function of the forecast horizon and analyze the 
speed with which it converges to a constant (which can be seen as a measure of the 
speed of convergence of the economy to the steady state). We look at a standard sticky-
prices-wages model, concluding that it delivers a strong theoretical forecastability of 
the variables under scrutiny, at odds with the data (professional forecasts). The ﬂ  exible 
prices-wages version delivers a forecastability closer to the data and performs relatively 
better empirically (with actual data), but mainly because forecasts deviate little from the 
unconditional mean. These results can be interpreted in at least two ways: ﬁ  rst, actual 
deviations from the steady-state are not persistent, in which case the implications of 
the speciﬁ  c formulation of nominal rigidities for short-run dynamics are unrealistic; 
second, exogenous (or unmodelled) steady-state shifts attributable to, e.g., changes 
in monetary-policy, taxation, regulation or in the growth of the technological frontier, 
occur in such a way as to strongly limit the performance of professional forecasters.
1.Introduction
Despite tremendous efforts over the past decades, macroeconomic forecasting seems as difﬁ  cult as 
before. For most variables forecast accuracy is low, naive models prove hard to beat and sophisticated 
statistical methods provide marginal (if any) improvements at long horizons. This degree of uncertainty 
should perhaps be considered a feature of the economy, as the same difﬁ  culty characterizes professional 
forecasts (say, from the Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters, henceforth Phil-SPF, the Federal 
Reserve Green Book, Fed Green-Book, or the European Central Bank Survey of Professional Forecasters, 
ECB-SPF). Still, there is clear evidence they rank very well in comparison with various statistical methods, 
being less prone to the structural instabilities of macroeconomic time series (e.g., Faust and Wright, 2007 
and Bernanke and Boivin, 2003 for evidence on Green-Book forecasts or Ang, Bakeart and Wei, 2007 
for Phil-SPF inﬂ  ation forecasts). Moreover, they can be seen as a fortunate aggregation of various indi-
vidual forecasts that probably adapt fast to changes in the economy, each using different data, different 
methods and even some judgment. The question we address is whether the behavior of these forecasts 
shares characteristics of theoretical and empirical forecasts produced by typical dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models. We will call the ﬁ  rst set of forecasts Professional” and the latter Rational”.
We view Professional forecasts as the best publicly available proxy for the forecasts produced by well 
*  This article is a summary of research done in collaboration with João Tovar Jalles, University of Cambridge. We 
would like to thank the comments of Nuno Alves, Mário Centeno and Ana Cristina Leal. The opinions hereby 
expressed are those of the author and do not reﬂ  ect the vision of Banco de Portugal or the Eurosystem. Any errors 
and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author.










sinformed agents in the economy, providing a natural benchmark against which to confront the forecasts 
produced by rational agents living in a model economy that is taken seriously. We assess the ﬁ  t of models 
to data by analyzing the differences in the relative performance of Rational vs Professional forecasts, 
paying special attention to the variance of the forecast errors as a function of the forecast horizon as well 
as to the speed with which it converges to a constant (the speed with which the forecasts converge to 
the unconditional mean of the variables under scrutiny). We view this exercise as useful to understand 
in which dimensions (or for which variables) theoretical models provide a reasonable description of the 
process (or speed) of convergence of the economy to the steady-state. We will interpret small differences 
in forecast accuracy (as a function of the forecast horizon) in the two worlds (Rational and Professional) 
as sign that the model is able to replicate an important dimension of actual data.
Our benchmark model economy will be the one discussed in Smets and Wouters (2007) in its New-
Keynesian (NK) and Real Business Cycle (RBC) versions (i.e., with and without nominal rigidities). The 
comparison of the two paradigms is instructive. In fact, nominal rigidities (along with real features adding 
persistence such as habit formation and investment adjustment costs) are often incorporated with the 
justiﬁ  cation that they enable the models to replicate the persistence of the response to various shocks 
identiﬁ  ed with vector autoregressions, i.e., impulse response functions that are still alive” after two or 
even three years horizons. This translates into theoretical forecastability of the corresponding variables 
at very long horizons. However, we conclude that for the growth of real variables such as consumption, 
investment or output, Professional forecasters don’t do better than the mean at horizons greater than 
3 or 4 quarters. The notable exception is the unemployment rate (which we take as a proxy for hours 
worked in the theoretical model). For nominal interest rates both forecasters and agents that know the 
economy (in a sticky price model) can form forecasts that are superior to the mean at very long horizons 
(which simple time series models also can due to the very high persistence of nominal rates). For inﬂ  a-
tion, forecasters still add to the mean after 5 quarters, but little, whereas the standard sticky-price-wage 
model (under standard parametrizations) is still far from the mean of the process at long horizons, 
clearly at odds with the data. The RBC version is silent with respect to nominal rates and inﬂ  ation but 
delivers forecasts of real variables that are closer (in terms of relative performance with respect to the 
unconditional mean and speed of convergence) to Professional forecasts. The notable exception relates 
to hours. Once we use these models to forecast actual data, the performance is extremely weak but less 
so with the RBC version (mainly because forecasts converge to the unconditional mean more rapidly). 
Again, the exception to this pattern is found with hours/unemployment.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 shows that, for a host of variables, the 
predictive power of Professional forecasts vanishes fast as the forecast horizon increases, i.e., the gains 
(if any) that one obtains by using these forecasts instead of a (real-time) estimate of the unconditional 
mean of the variables are small. Section 3 confronts these facts with the theoretical and empirical 
performance of a standard DSGE model, whereas section 4 pays special attention to what occurs during 
recessions. Section 5 concludes.
2. Professional Forecasts: how much they deliver
Here we assess the predictive power of U.S. Professional forecasts, measuring simply their performance 
relative to an estimate of the unconditional mean of the variables analyzed.1 In this way we investigate 
how informative these forecasts are and until when (in terms of forecast horizon) they provide relevant 
signal relative to what can be viewed as a steady-state forecast. It is still early to conduct a similar and 
conclusive analysis with euro area data due to sample size restrictions while for the purposes of our study 
the origin of the data is not relevant.
1  Analysis of the forecast performance of Phil-SPF is routinely conducted at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-


























































We analyze 15 macroeconomic indicators from the Phil-SPF,2 namely: Nominal output measured by 
GNP/GDP (NOUTPUT), Real GNP/GDP (ROUTPUT), Industrial Production Index - Total (IPT), Real Personal 
Consumption Expenditures - Total (RCON), Net Exports (NETEXP), GDP deﬂ  ator (GDPDEF), Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), Real Gross Private Domestic Investment -- Residential (RINVRESID), Real Gross Private 
Domestic Investment -- Nonresidential (RINVBF), Real Government Consumption and Gross Invest-
ment -- State and Local (RGLS), Real Government Consumption and Gross Investment -- Federal (RGF), 
Housing Starts (HSTARTS), unemployment (UNRATE), 3 -month T-bill rate (TB3MS) and 10 year T-bond 
rate (GS10). All data is ﬁ  rstly aggregated quarterly when necessary (to be consistent with the variables 
forecasted in the Phil-SPF) and except for unemployment and interest rates, all data is in growth rates. 
We look only at point forecasts and deﬁ  ne these as the median forecast (across all respondents) in every 
release of the survey (results with the mean forecast are very similar). The individual respondent’s point 
forecast are generally close to the central tendencies of their subjective distributions (e.g., Engelberg 
et al. 2009) while there is clear evidence that this aggregation produces forecasts that are in general 
superior to individual forecasts. Obviously, a not so straightforward aggregation can result in forecast 
improvements, and this can be achieved even when there is (as in Phil-SPF) entry and exit of forecasters, 
see Capistrán and Timmerman (2009).
Fed Green-Book forecasts will not be analyzed here, please refer to the working paper version of this 
article, but we can refer that Phil-SPF forecasts represent best practice, or close to best practice, within 
professional forecasts. In any case, we should refer that Romer and Romer (2000), using data until 1991, 
have shown that Fed-Green Book forecasts of inﬂ  ation and real GDP are statistically unbiased and domi-
nate private sector forecasts (i.e., suggesting that the Federal Reserve had considerably more information 
beyond what is known to the private sector). The period of Great Moderation”3 between 1982-2007 
has affected the time-series properties of many variables as well as the performance of Professional fore-
casts. In particular, D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) show that the superior forecast performance of the 
Fed-Green Book deteriorated considerably after 1991, with Phil-SPF forecasts taking the lead. We have 
reached similar conclusions. In the remainder of the paper we will thus focus exclusively on Phil-SPF fore-
casts, regarding them as a proxy of the best forecasts produced by well-informed agents in the economy.
2.2. Methodology
We begin our analysis by taking the real-time vintage data from 1968q4 through 1981q3 -h quarters, 
for
 
1,...,5 h = .4 We then estimate the unconditional mean of the variables under scrutiny by simply 
computing the average of each variable for this vintage, which is our benchmark forecast for 1981q3. As 
a reference, we also compute forecasts from an estimated Direct Autoregression (AR) using data through 
1981q3 - h. We repeat this procedure using the vintage from 1968q4 through 1981q4 - h, 1,...,5 h =
and so forth until 2009q2. It should be noted that most variables are available with a delay of one quarter. 
Hence, to properly compare these benchmark forecasts with Phil-SPF’s and Fed-Green Book’s forecasts 
we re-label the forecast horizon so that the information sets with each method approximately coincide 
(so, the h step ahead, with 04 h ££, Phil-SPF’s and Green-Book’s forecasts will be considered as 1 h +  
step ahead forecasts since the latest observation of the variable to be forecasted does not in general 
2  For complete information on the survey’s background see http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/
real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/spf-documentation.pdf as well as Zarnowitz (1969), Zarno-
witz and Braun (1992) and Croushore (1993).
3 See,  e.g., McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Watson (2003) and Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin 
(2008).
4  These series were retrieved from the Philadelphia Fed website. http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-











srefer to the forecast moment,5 which is approximately the middle of the quarter since at least 1990q36).
We then compare the forecast accuracy of the different surveys’ predictions, AR and also real-time average 
by computing the ratio of Root Mean Square Forecast Error (RMSFE) of both the AR and Professional 
forecasts relative to the benchmark forecast (real-time average). It should be noted that the forecast 
error is deﬁ  ned as the difference between the forecast and the corresponding observation of the latest 
vintage of data available (results considering theh  quarters ahead vintage alter little the results, at least 
in relative terms, see also Stark 2010 for a thorough analysis of this issue). Following Fair and Shiller 
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 where  th y
+ is the observation of the variable forecasted,
real f is the forecast from the real-time average,
x f is the forecast from the candidate model x, in our case either the AR process or the Professional 
forecasts and  th e + is a regression error. Obviously, if 
1 0 b ¹ then forecasts from candidate model x 
add information relative to the “real-time average”. Both the RMSFE ratios and the 1 b coefﬁ  cients are 
computed and presented for the full sample as well as for an aggregation of recession quarters as deﬁ  ned 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
It is important to note that a forecast performing as well as an estimate of the unconditional mean in 
terms of RMSFE (or encompassed by it, in which case 
1 0 b = ) may nonetheless be useful if it can 
more often accurately predict the direction of change in the actual series (Joutz and Stekler, 2000). With 
this in mind we will examine the sign forecast accuracy of the forecasts by constructing the following 
two-by-two contingency table in which the actual and forecast data for each quarter are classiﬁ  ed (i) by 
whether the actual change in a given variable is positive (+) or negative/zero (-,0), and (ii) whether the 
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where the actual change is 
th th t yyy ++ D=- and the predicted change is 
xx
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++ D= - . Note 
that t y is the most recent (quarterly) value known at the time of the forecast. The main diagonal cells 
include numbers of correct sign forecasts and the the other cells include the numbers of incorrect sign 
forecasts. We then test the null hypothesis of no association between the frequency of actual and predicted 
changes (because correct predicted changes will always occur, what matters is whether their frequency 
is higher than what would be expected if actual and predicted changes were completely unrelated).
2.3. Results and Discussion
2.3.1. Forecast Accuracy
Our main empirical results regarding forecast accuracy of Phil-SPF forecasts are presented in Table 1, 
referring to the 15 macroeconomic variables deﬁ  ned before. It contains the ratio of the Root Mean Square 
Forecast Error (RMSFE) of both the AR and Professional forecasts relative to the benchmark forecast 
(real-time average) as well as the estimate of 1 b resulting from OLS estimation of Eq. (1) at different 
forecast horizons. Results are presented for the full sample and for an aggregation of recession periods. 
5  This does not apply, e.g., to interest rates, whose quarterly average is to be forecasted but are obviously availa-
ble in the middle of the quarter, when the forecast is made.
6  The timing of the previous American Statistical Association/NBER survey (that was taken by the Philadelphia FED) 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIThe main conclusions follow:
•  considering the full sample, Phil-SPF forecasts add signal relative to the benchmark (real-time 
average) only up to  2 h = when looking at the signiﬁ  cance of the  1 b coefﬁ  cients. The exceptions 
are Phil-SPF’s CPI inﬂ  ation, unemployment and interest rates predictions throughout the different 
forecast horizons and Phil-SPF’s RGLS (State and Local Government Consumption and Gross 
investment growth) up to  4 h = .
•  considering the full sample, the relative (to the real-time average) RMSFE for Phil-SPF’s forecasts 
is clearly less than one for all horizons only in the case of unemployment, interest rates and, in a 
lesser extent, inﬂ  ation (CPI and GDP deﬂ  ator). In the case of 10 year bond interest rates the AR 
outperforms Phil-SPF whereas for the 3-month T bill rate the opposite is true. For output (nominal 
and real) and specially industrial production, housing starts and net exports this ratio indicates 
mostly useless Phil-SPF forecasts at horizons greater than or equal to  2 h = . For consumption, 
investment (residential and non-residential) and Government expenditures (federal and local) there 
is still some superiority on average (relative to the real-time average) at horizons  3, 4,5 h = . In 
these cases however, it would in general sufﬁ  ce to use a simple autoregression as the rel. RMSFE 
compares favorably with Phil-SPF’s.
•  for all variables except (again) interest rates, inﬂ  ation and unemployment, Phil-SPF (and AR) 
forecasts that correspond to recession periods have a quite poor performance relative to the 
real-time average except at  1 h = . Afterwards the rel. RMSFEs are higher than those obtained 
with the full sample and more frequently well above 1. This evidence is in line with e.g. Zarnowitz 
(1992) , Zarnowitz and Braun (1992), McNees (1992) and McNees and Ries (1983) who reported 
a number of systematic errors made by forecasters regarding recession periods. For  2, h =
1 b    
is nonetheless still signiﬁ  cant for Phil-SPF in the case of consumption and for AR forecasts in the 
cases of state and local government expenditures, non-residential private investment and industrial 
production, despite the fact that rel. RMSFE is above 1.
Putting it simply, this exercise shows that for most variables a real-time estimate of the conditional mean 
is a hard to beat forecast even at short horizons. Regarding unemployment, nominal interest rates and 
inﬂ  ation, Professional forecasts do contain relevant information beyond that of our crude benchmark 
forecast. In these cases, however, it is more clear that the distance between these forecasts and the 
real-time average forecast is surely overstated, in the sense that the latter is supposed to measure a 
steady-sate value that may be varying over time (e.g., due to changes in monetary policy or labor market 
institutions). This is not damaging for our purposes as it allows us to refer to this distance as an upper 
bound on what a theoretical model (without regime shifts in monetary policy or labor market institutions) 
ought to deliver in terms of forecast accuracy relative to the steady-state forecast.
2.3.2. Sign forecast accuracy
Table 2 reports the cell counts for the contingency table described in section 2.2 and p-values for the 
null hypothesis of no association between actual and predicted changes for the Phil-SPF and real-time 
average forecasts. First, it is clear that most p-values for Phil-SPF forecasts are less than 0.1, or the null 
hypothesis of no association between actual and predicted changes is rejected, indicating that, in general, 
these forecasts accurately predict the direction of change in the actual series more often than what luck 
would determine. What is more interesting for our purposes is to compare the behavior of Professional 
forecasts to that of the benchmark (real-time average) forecast. First, we observe that for  1, 2 h =  
Phil-SPF’s forecasts are, in general, clearly more informative than the real-time average (lower associated 
p-values), according to this criterion. Second, for real output Phil-SPF’s forecasts do not clearly look more 
useful than the benchmark at  3, 4,5 h = . But the main result emerging from Table 2 is that at horizons 
greater than  2 h =  and for all other variables except interest rates, CPI inﬂ  ation, unemployment and 
to a lesser extent State and local Government spending, the null of no association (no valuable predic-

























































































































Notes: P-value (or Fisher’s exact test) is for testing the null hy-
pothesis of no association between the direction of change in the 



























































IIwhen the null is not rejected for Phil-SPF forecasts, it is often rejected in the case of real-time average 
forecasts. All in all, the main message is that (with the exceptions mentioned) Professional forecasts 
certainly loose marginal informational content when compared to the benchmark after 2/3 quarters, in 
line with the previous subsection.
3.How does a Standard DSGE model forecast?
3.1.The model
We move now towards the core of the article, comparing the results above with the theoretical and 
empirical forecast performance of the medium-scale model analyzed and estimated in Smets and Wouters 
(2007) (henceforth SW07), based on Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005). The model 
has many of the features now popular in the growing so-called DSGE literature7 including monopolistic 
competition in the goods and labour markets, ingredients aimed at improving the ﬁ  t of the model to 
observables such as habit formation in consumption, investment adjustment costs, variable capacity 
utilization (all of these implying ampliﬁ  cation of the effects of shocks) and crucially, nominal frictions 
such as sticky prices and wages along with partial backward-looking indexation. Monetary policy follows 
a Taylor rule and has real effects when nominal frictions are important. Seven shocks are included (total 
factor productivity, investment productivity, monetary policy, government spending, risk premium along 
with price and wage markup shocks) as well as seven observables: output, investment, consumption, 
wages (all in log differences, or growth rates) as well as inﬂ  ation, nominal interest rates and (log of) hours.
We use exactly the same data treatment as in SW07, implying that the match between the model’s 
variables and Phil-SPF’s counterparts is not perfect. Speciﬁ  cally, SW07 observables for output, consump-
tion, investment and wages are expressed in per capita (working age population) terms and nominal 
interest rates are measured with the Federal funds rate (quite close to the 3-month T-bill rate from Phil-
SPF nonetheless). The inﬂ  ation measure in the model is GDP deﬂ  ator inﬂ  ation (i.e., perfect match with 
Phil-SPF) whereas (minus) Phil-SPF’s unemployment, while following closely hours, surely drifts somehow 
from the concept in the model.
We analyze the forecast performance of two versions of SW07: the original one featuring nominal rigidi-
ties, or New-Keynesian (NK) version, and another where we shut down these rigidities (RBC version, 
where we further reduce the observables by eliminating inﬂ  ation and nominal interest rates). We use 
Smets and Wouters’s estimated parameters (mode of the posterior distribution, obtained from combining 
the likelihood function with a set of independent priors for the 41 structural parameters included in the 
model) using data from 1984q1 through 2004q2. We choose this sample to avoid quibbles regarding 
the onset of the “Great Moderation” and likely changes in monetary policy within the period starting in 
1966q1 (SW07’s beginning of the sample). We arguably go against the RBC version by not re-estimating 
the model, i.e., we keep ﬁ  xed the structural parameters not related to nominal rigidities. Forecasts of 
the observables are just conditional expectations given the model and are obtained with the Kalman 
ﬁ  lter, which is also used to derive the theoretical covariances of the forecast errors for various horizons.8
We start with a theoretical analysis of the forecastability of the various variables implied by the model , 
i.e., we assume the model is the economy and derive analytically the standard deviation of the forecast 
errors at various horizons. The (artiﬁ  cial) sample size is set at  160 T =  (thinking in 40 year of post-war 
quarterly data). Chart 1 presents the theoretical relative (to the standard deviation of the variables) root 
7 See,  e.g., Adolfson et. al. (2007, 2008) and Christiano et al. (2009) for further (and growing) models.
8  For the theoretical analysis this only implies that agents would be using a minimum mean square criterion if 
they were to pick this as a point forecast, i.e., they know the parameters of the model and produce conditional 
expectations given the state space model. Regarding the empirical analysis in the paper, it is fair to say that Baye-
sian estimation of the models would make natural using as point forecasts the mean of the predictive density of 










smean squared forecast error (RMSFE) for output, consumption, investment, inﬂ  ation, hours, nominal 
interest rate and wages of the original SW07 (NK version). As easily concluded, for nominal interest 
rates, inﬂ  ation but also hours, there is a very strong predictability at short horizons, the relative RMSFE 
converges slowly and after 20 quarters this ratio is still around 0.4 for inﬂ  ation and nominal interest rates 
and 0.7 for hours. For consumption, output and investment the initial level lies around 0.45-0.55 but 
convergence is fast except for investment. Wages is the least predictable variable, with a relative RMSFE 
starting around 0.8. All this means that a rational agent understanding this economy should be able to 
forecast in such a way as to beat clearly the unconditional mean in the case of hours, inﬂ  ation, nominal 
interest rates even at very long horizons. For consumption, output and specially investment, he would 
clearly beat the mean even at 6 quarters ahead.
In the case of the RBC version (Chart 2) the conclusions are naturally quite different. The model becomes 
silent with respect to inﬂ  ation and nominal interest rates but for the remaining variables the convergence 
of the RMSFE towards the standard deviation of the variables is much faster. For output, the relative 
RMSFE is around 0.8 for 1-step ahead forecasts and above 0.9 afterwards. For consumption and invest-
ment the speed of convergence is lower but clearly higher than that of the sticky prices/wages version. 
For wages, there is only signiﬁ  cant predictability at 1-step ahead whereas for hours convergence of the 
RMSFE towards the standard deviation is slow but at a level clearly above that of the NK version. Now, 
it is important to note that this feature of the speciﬁ  c NK model analysed here is certainly common to 
any model featuring price and wage setting frictions along with an important indexation mechanism (to 
target or current inﬂ  ation or a combination of the two) aimed at rationalizing the observed persistence 
of inﬂ  ation, see e.g., the models in Christiano et al. (2005), Adolfson et al. (2007), Ireland (2007) or 
Schorfheide (2005). This occurs because indexation generates high persistence in inﬂ  ation and in other 
variables (and thus strong forecastability). In other way, any deviation of inﬂ  ation from target in this kind 
of world represents a persistent (forecastable) deviation of the economy from its steady state.
Chart 1 Chart 2
















































GDP Cons Inv Hours Wages
Source: Author’s calculations. Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents the relative (to the standard devia-
tion of the variables) RMSFE for each macro variable of interest 
at different forecast horizons (up to 20).
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents the relative RMSFE for each macro 

























































II3.2. Model vs. Data
Here we confront the results in section 2, regarding Phil-SPF’s forecasts, with the theoretical and empirical 
forecast accuracy of the NK and RBC versions of SW07 analyzed above. To be clear, we view the relative 
(to the standard deviation) RMSFE of well-informed agents in the economy (Professional forecasters), as 
a statistic that should be matched by a realistic DSGE model, just as it should deliver steady-state ratios, 
volatilities and correlations that are close to what is observed in the data. E.g., if this relative RMSFE for 
output growth at 1 quarter horizon is 0.3 in the model and 0.8 in the case of Professional forecasters 
(data), we view this as an indication that the model delivers a forecastability that is at odds with the 
data. And similarly if after 10 quarters the model is still able to clearly outperform the mean whereas 
Professional forecasters don’t. Comparison of Professional and Rational (given the model) forecasts can 
thus inform theory or at least show the limitations of the theoretical models, even though the mapping 
from Rational to Professional forecasts may be considered loose.
If nothing else, we believe Professional forecasts allow us to measure how fast (from the perspective 
of the forecasters) the economy is moving towards the steady-state. Speciﬁ  cally, we can measure this 
convergence to the steady-state through the speed with which the RMSFE converges to the standard 
deviation of the variables. In fact, if after some time (horizon) the forecast is (on average) very close to 
the unconditional mean of the variable under scrutiny, this means the forecaster believes the economy 
(or at least that variable) takes as much time to reach the steady-state (in the absence of unpredictable 
shocks). With rational expectations this must be a characteristic of the process generating the data.9
Now, results in the previous section suggest that for most real variables (and in particular output, invest-
ment and consumption) Professional forecasts loose grip after 2 quarters, meaning that using as forecast 
an estimate of the unconditional mean of the variables does not imply loosing valuable information. 
Professional forecasts of unemployment and nominal interest rates are still clearly superior to the mean 
after one year whereas for inﬂ  ation (CPI and GDP) there is forecastability but in a lesser extent. Notice 
further that we are using as benchmark a real-time estimate of the mean. If this mean is time-varying or 
shifts occasionally, e.g., if the steady-state changes due to changes in taxation or in monetary policy (that 
changes for instance target inﬂ  ation), the real-time average will not be efﬁ  cient whereas professional 
forecasters are probably aware of these shifts. This is useful for our purposes as it allows us to interpret 
the relative RMSFE of Professional forecasts (which is thus deﬂ  ated) as a lower bound on what a realistic 
theoretical model (without steady-state shifts) ought to deliver in terms of forecast accuracy relative to 
the steady-state forecast. Similarly then, in the mapping from Professional forecasts to the theoretical 
performance of SW07, we must see the model as corrected for regime changes, hence we cannot be 
as demanding when using the models in a pseudo out-of sample forecasting exercise with actual data.
Table 3 compares the results, for the theoretical and empirical (with actual data) relative (to the standard 
deviation) RMSFE of the NK and RBC versions of SW07, vis-a-vis that obtained with Phil-SPF forecasts. 
In the analysis of the empirical performance we focus on the sample 1981q3- 2009q2  (coinciding with 
the previous SPF’s evaluation sample). If we take ﬁ  rst the theoretical rel. RMSFE for output and invest-
ment, it is clear that the distance between the rel. RMSFE of Phil-SPF and that of the theoretical model 
is in general smaller for the RBC model, clearly so for all h in the case of investment and for  3, 4,5 h =      
in the case of output. At  1, 2 h =    in the case of output, the RBC has a clearly lower forecastability. 
This result for output and investment contrasts to what obtains with the NK version, where the strong 
predictability at  1 h =    and even at long horizons is at odds with Phil-SPF. In the case of consumption 
the RBC is more successful at matching the data when  1, 2 h = , whereas for  3, 4,5 h =  the evidence 
favors the NK version (notice however that it may well be the case that the rel. RMSFE obtained with 
Phil-SPF may not be statistically different from 1). With respect to hours/unemployment (we recall that 
9  We are certainly aware of the difﬁ  culty of characterizing as rational a consensus (mean or median) forecast, see 
e.g., Bonham and Cohen (2001). Rationality should arguably be analysed at the individual level but exit and 










sPhil-SPF forecasts unemployment, which explains nonetheless around 80% of the variation in hours), 
the RBC is closer to Phil-SPF at all horizons, although the rel. RMSFE is consistently above that of Phil-
SPF for  2 h ³ . This is in clear contrast with the strong predictability implied by the NK model. The RBC 
version is silent with respect to the nominal interest rate and inﬂ  ation but for the NK model it is clear 
that while the behavior of the rel RMSFE function is very close to that of Phil-SPF in the case of nominal 
interest rates, for inﬂ  ation the very high forecastability of the NK model does not match data from Phil-
SPF forecasts. We notice also that even if the rational agent uses the forecasts produced by the univariate 
representation of inﬂ  ation given the model (NK univariate, i.e., using only past inﬂ  ation to produce the 
forecast), the strong forecastability of inﬂ  ation is almost unchanged. This seems a consequence of the 
degree of backward looking behavior (indexation) of inﬂ  ation in the NK model. Once the rational agent 
observes current inﬂ  ation and its history, information on other shocks is almost irrelevant to form the 
conditional expectation of inﬂ  ation at some point in the future. If the model is realistic, this implies that 
a forecaster would only need to nail the univariate representation of inﬂ  ation in order to obtain a close 
to efﬁ  cient forecast.
Now, demanding from the models forecasts of actual data changes radically, in absolute terms, the picture 
above, with a clear deterioration of the empirical counterpart of the statistics above.10 Nonetheless, Table 
3 (bottom panel) shows that for real output and investment the RBC is close to Phil-SPF (and dramatically 
superior to the NK version). For wages (no data for Phil-SPF) the performance of both models is very 
similar whereas for consumption both the RBC and NK versions have a very weak performance (although 
the latter performs relatively better at horizons greater than 5 quarters, despite the fact that forecasts 
are close to the mean). For nominal interest rates , the NK model is close to Phil-SPF at  1, 2 h =  but 
it drifts quite fast afterwards, becoming useless after 6 quarters (in clear contrast with the theoretical 
result). For inﬂ  ation, the empirical performance of the NK model is beyond terrible, a qualiﬁ  cation 
also deserved for the behavior of the RBC version with respect to hours (in this case the NK version is 
clearly more informative but not much compared to Phil-SPF at  2 h > ). As far as we are aware, only 
Rubaszek and Skrzypczynski (2008) compared forecasts from a (3 equations prototypical) DSGE model 
to SPF forecasts while using real-time data for estimation and forecasting (instead of the latest vintage of 
data and a ﬁ  xed set of parameters, useful for our purposes). Their sample size is also larger than usual, 
spanning 1994:q1-2006:q2. The main conclusions are that while for a few horizons in the case of GDP 
growth the DSGE model seems to outperform SPF (not statistically signiﬁ  cant difference in accuracy), 
in the case of inﬂ  ation and short-term nominal interest rate SPF clearly outperforms the DSGE model.11
All in all, the results above suggest that the nominal rigidities apparatus of the NK model, which greatly 
ampliﬁ  es the effects of shocks, tended to produce an excessively large theoretical forecastability, extending 
over long horizons. This seems clearly at odds with the data. The stripped down ﬂ  exible prices version 
(RBC) delivers a forecastability resembling more that of the Phil-SPF while performing relatively better 
empirically (the important exception relates to hours/unemployment). This is due to the fact that deviations 
from the steady-state tend to be small, hence forecasts (conditional expectations) are closer to the mean 
of the variables. Thus, not taking risks (or not assuming a detailed knowledge of short-run dynamics) 
compensated in this context. The RBC model seemed more immune to misspeciﬁ  cation (notice also that 
the RBC version was not even re-estimated, it keeps all the parameters from the estimated NK model).
Next we repeat the analysis for recession periods.
10 Again, it is fair to recognize that the literature aknowledges the likely misspeciﬁ  cation of DSGE models. E.g., 
Del Negro et al. (2007) approximate a DSGE model by a vector autoregression (VAR) and then relax the implied 
cross-equation restrictions in order to improve ﬁ  t. It is possible to optimally relax these restrictions and it is found 
that forecast accuracy improvements obtain.
11 Edge et al. (2010) do compare the forecast performance of an alternative DSGE model to Green-Book forecasts 


























































II4. How do Rational and Professional Forecasts behave during Recessions?
There is clear evidence that macroeconomic forecasts fail to predict business-cycle’s turning points and, 
moreover, forecasting the beginning of a recession one or two quarters in advance never occurred. In 
this aspect data (professional forecasts) are in line with standard models, where recessions must be seen 
as the result of large exogenous shocks (or at least unpredictable shocks in size and moment). Hence, 
one should not demand (or expect) accurate forecasts referred to the ﬁ  rst period (quarter) of a recession. 
Afterwards, the theoretical mechanisms embodied in the models should be helpful in determining the 
path of observed variables.
Table 3 
RELATIVE RMSFE OF SPF’S FORECASTS VIS-A-VIS THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL NK AND RBC 
MODELS’ PREDICTIONS
PANEL A - THEORETICAL
Variáveis Modelo Horizon
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Real GDP growth SPF 0.66 0.78 0.91 0.96 0.98 - - - - - - - -
RBC 0.79 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
NK 0.55 0.69 0.78 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00
Consumption SPF 0.68 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.83 - - - - - - - -
RBC 0.64 0.83 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
NK 0.41 0.59 0.72 0.82 0.88 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98
RNR investment SPF 0.65 0.73 0.79 0.90 0.94 - - - - - - - -
RBC 0.63 0.82 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.02
NK 0.43 0.59 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87
Hours SPF 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.30 0.36 - - - - - - - -
RBC 0.18 0.31 0.40 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.74
NK 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.39 0.46 0.53 0.59
Wages SPF ----- --------
RBC 0.53 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NK 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95
Inﬂ  ation SPF 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.77 - - - - - - - -
Univariate (NK-based) 0.14 0.29 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.86
NK 0.13 0.27 0.38 0.46 0.53 0.58 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.86
Interest Rates SPF 0.09 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.33 - - - - - - - -
Univariate (NK-based) 0.14 0.29 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.86
NK 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.33 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.58
PANEL B - EMPIRICAL
Variáveis Modelo Horizon
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Real GDP growth SPF 0.66 0.78 0.91 0.96 0.98 - - - - - - - -
RBC 0.84 0.86 0.99 1.02 1.13 1.16 1.20 1.23 1.23 1.20 1.18 1.14 1.13
NK 1.66 1.71 1.76 1.62 1.73 1.58 1.36 1.21 1.13 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.09
Consumption SPF 0.68 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.83 - - - - - - - -
RBC 1.19 1.31 1.47 1.67 1.73 1.79 1.68 1.59 1.43 1.26 1.20 1.09 1.06
NK 2.00 2.05 1.76 1.42 1.36 1.28 1.02 0.95 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.95 1.00
RNR investment SPF 0.65 0.73 0.79 0.90 0.94 - - - - - - - -
RBC 0.66 0.93 1.07 1.10 1.06 1.02 0.95 0.96 0.99 1.03 1.10 1.13 1.15
NK 1.23 2.15 2.75 2.96 2.91 2.76 2.22 1.84 1.50 1.31 1.23 1.18 1.17
Hours SPF 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.30 0.36 - - - - - - - -
RBC 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.06 1.09 1.14 1.17 1.19
NK 0.09 0.26 0.47 0.66 0.79 0.92 1.11 1.26 1.30 1.26 1.27 1.23 1.29
Wages SPF ----- --------
RBC 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.06 1.09 1.12 1.14
NK 1.08 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.07 1.09 1.13 1.16 1.18
Inﬂ  ation SPF 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.77 - - - - - - - -
NK 4.13 4.63 4.71 4.33 4.00 3.70 3.06 2.38 2.22 2.19 2.13 2.21 2.22
Interest Rates SPF 0.09 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.33 - - - - - - - -
NK 0.06 0.19 0.39 0.64 0.90 1.11 1.48 1.68 1.85 2.00 2.09 2.15 2.21
Sources: Author’s calculations
Notes: This table presents the relative (to the standard deviation of the variables) RMSFE at different forecast horizons, from 
h=1,…,20 for the SPF, theoretical and empirical NK and RBC models. Panel A also includes the univariate version of the NK SW07 










sHere we show that the conclusions above seem to carry over to recession12 periods, and are certainly 
magniﬁ  ed. That is, the performance of the NK version of SW07 is quite poor compared to that of the 
RBC version. First, we recall that Professional forecasts (from the Fed-Green Book or SPF) have a poorer 
(relative to an estimate of the unconditional mean) performance during recession periods, specially at 
horizons greater or equal to 3 quarters. The exceptions occur with inﬂ  ation and nominal interest rates 
as well as with housing market variables for short horizons (housing starts and residential investment). 
Despite this, they are clearly more accurate than model forecasts. To analyze this we simply plot the various 
forecast (Phil-SPF, NK and RBC) for  1,...,5 h =  for real GDP growth, inﬂ  ation and interest rates (Chart 
3) Analysis of other real variables conveys a very similar message. As easily seen, Professional forecasts 
of real GDP have no clue about the beginning and dynamics of recessions with an anticipation of 2 or 
more quarters (3 ) h ³ whereas 1 quarter earlier they have some signal and for the current quarter 
they are accurate ( 1 h = , we recall that one step ahead forecasts in the case of Professional forecasts 
is really a nowcast). Now, although the RBC model performs poorly relative to professional forecasts, 
the characterization is very similar. The RBC obviously does not anticipate the recessions but provides 
signal about subsequent developments when  1, 2 h = . The performance of the NK model is clearly 
very weak, specially during the last recession, where observed deﬂ  ation and very low nominal interest 
rates contribute to forecasts that never consider consecutive negative growth (but instead a quick way 
out of the recession). This is clearly not the case in the 1991 and 2001 recessions. Again, the defensive” 
(or close to steady-state) dynamics implicit in the RBC version seem to at least produce forecasts that 
have some signal (although deﬁ  nitely close to the steady-state, or unconditional mean). For inﬂ  ation 
and nominal interest rates we observe that professional forecasts are very accurate at short horizons 
and convey some signal at longer horizons. For nominal interest rates, the NK model does not produce 
out of bounds forecasts, but they are weak compared to those of surveys. For inﬂ  ation, NK forecasts are 
very poor and do seem out of bounds, except during the last recession.
12 As identiﬁ  ed by the NBER dates. For the purposes of this section we include a quarter before and a quarter after 
the recessions to capture turning points.
Chart 3 (to be continued)
REAL GDP GROWTH AND SPF FORECASTS AT 
NBER RECESSIONS
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1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Real GDP growth NK h=1 NK h=2
NK h=3 NK h=4 NK h=5
Source: Author’s calculations. Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents both the actual realization and SPF 
forecasts for real GDP growth between 1981 and 2009, the 
latter set plotting only observations at different horizons (1 to 
5) for recession periods as identiﬁ  ed by the NBER.
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents both the actual realization and NK 
forecasts for real GDP growth between 1981 and 2009, the 
latter set plotting only observations at different horizons (1 to 

























































IIChart 3 (to be continued)
REAL GDP GROWTH AND RBC FORECASTS AT 
NBER RECESSIONS
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Real GDP growth RBC h=1 RBC h=2









1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Deflator SPF h=1 SPF h=2
SPF h=3 SPF h=4 SPF h=5
Source: Author’s calculations. Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents both the actual realization RBC fore-
casts for real GDP growth between 1981 and 2009, the latter 
set plotting only observations at different horizons (1 to 5) for 
recession periods as identiﬁ  ed by the NBER.
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents both the actual realization and pre-
dicted SPF values for inﬂ  ation (GDP deﬂ  ator) between 1981 
and 2009, the latter set plotting only observations at different 
horizons (1 to 5) for recession periods as identiﬁ  ed by the NBER.
GDP DEFLATOR INFLATION AND NK FORECASTS 
AT NBER RECESSIONS
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1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Tbill SPF h=1 SPF h=2
SPF h=3 SPF h=4 SPF h=5
Source: Author’s calculations. Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents both the actual realization and NK 
forecasts of GDP inﬂ  ation  between 1981 and 2009, the latter 
set plotting only observations at different horizons (1 to 5) for 
recession periods as identiﬁ  ed by the NBER.
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents both the actual realization and SPF 
forecasts for interest rates (T bill) between 1981 and 2009, the 
latter set plotting only observations at different horizons (1 to 























1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Interest Federal Funds NK h=1 NK h=2
NK h=3 NK h=4 NK h=5
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: This ﬁ  gure presents both the actual realization and NK forecasts for interest rates (Federal Funds rate) between 1981 and 
2009, the latter set plotting only observations at different horizons (1 to 5) for recession periods as identiﬁ  ed by the NBER.
5.Concluding remarks
It seems unwise to expect too much from macroeconomic forecasts. For what really matters (real vari-
ables, but except for unemployment) best practice has little to say at horizons greater than 2, 3 quarters. 
If statistics derived from these facts inform general equilibrium modelling, in the sense that a rational 
agent understanding the economy should deduce similar statistics, they probably say the economy has 
not been deviating too much from the steady-state. In the theoretical models, this should translate into 
low forecastability (relative to a naive, or steady-state forecast and, again, except for unemployment - 
hours) of most variables. This occurs with the RBC version of the model analyzed here but clearly not 
with the NK version. Furthermore, even recognizing limitations in a model without nominal frictions 
and correspondingly limited departures from the steady-state, the fact is that empirical forecasts seem 
to indicate that the model less prone to misspeciﬁ  cation is the RBC version. Forecasts are closer to naive 
(or to steady-state values) but provide some signal. The alternative (relying on a particular description of 
nominal rigidities) is not reliable. In our view, and given the effects of the inclusion of nominal frictions 
on forecast performance (theoretical and empirical), care should be taken at least on the way trend 
inﬂ  ation (or varying central bank target) is modeled. In the model analyzed here and many others, the 
central bank target (steady-state inﬂ  ation) is ﬁ  xed, which implies that any deviation of inﬂ  ation from 
target is necessarily interpreted by the model as a deviation from the steady-state (inﬂ  ation gap). In order 
to improve ﬁ  t the models must then include indexation mechanisms. In this respect we are persuaded by 
Cogley and Sbordone’s (2008) analysis that once movements in trend inﬂ  ation are taken into account, 
the (backward looking) indexation component of a general New-Keynesian Phillips curve is not needed 
to ﬁ  t the data well. If indexation is incorrectly assumed, it implies a supposedly high theoretical forecast-
ability of inﬂ  ation (even if a rational agent only looks at past inﬂ  ation) as we have shown. This is clearly 
at odds with the data (Professional forecasts) and does not survive a forecast evaluation with actual 
data. Another interpretation of the results rests on the observation that theoretical models used to ﬁ  t 
several decades of data are likely missing relevant changes in monetary policy, product and labor market 
regulation, taxation or in the trend growth of technology. If these changes are reasonably unpredictable, 
there is potential compatibility between professional forecasters having a hard time and the NK model 
becoming seriously misspeciﬁ  ed only along those dimensions, i.e., nominal rigidities can play an important 
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